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IDEsaster: 30+ Vulnerabilities Expose AI IDEs to Data Theft and Code Execution
A recent research effort uncovered more than 30 security vulnerabilities across AI-powered Integrated Development Environments (IDEs), exposing developers to data theft, remote code execution, and supply-chain risks. Collectively named IDEsaster, the flaws highlight how AI agents introduce new attack surfaces by transforming long-standing IDE features into exploitable primitives.
Context
Modern IDEs increasingly embed autonomous AI agents capable of reading, writing, and modifying code and configuration files. These assistants also integrate with Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers and external data sources. While these capabilities improve productivity, they dramatically expand risk if an attacker can influence what the AI sees.
What Happened
Security researcher Ari Marzouk identified universal exploit chains affecting leading AI IDEs and extensions including Cursor, Copilot, Zed.dev, Roo Code, Junie, Kiro.dev, Claude Code, and others.
Twenty-four issues received CVEs. The attacks were feasible across all platforms tested, enabling:
Context hijacking
Unauthorized file reads and writes
Manipulation of IDE configuration
Arbitrary command execution
Silent data exfiltration
Technical Breakdown
IDEsaster chains three core attack vectors:
Prompt Injection
The attacker hijacks the AI agent’s context—via hidden characters, poisoned URLs, malicious MCP servers, or embedded instructions in project files.Auto-Approved Tool Calls
Many AI agents execute read/write operations without user confirmation.Legitimate IDE Features
Once context is compromised, the agent can trigger built-in functionality to leak data or modify configuration files.
Examples include:
CVE-2025-49150, CVE-2025-53097, CVE-2025-58335:
Reading sensitive files and writing JSON schemas that cause outbound data leaks.CVE-2025-53773, CVE-2025-54130, CVE-2025-55012:
Editing settings files to point interpreters to malicious executables, enabling code execution.CVE-2025-64660, CVE-2025-61590:
Injecting malicious workspace settings that run automatically without user interaction.
These exploits require no jailbreak and no explicit tool abuse—the agent simply follows the sequence of instructions it believes the user intended.
Impact Analysis
The vulnerabilities enable:
Unauthorized reading of sensitive project files
Remote execution of malicious binaries
Hidden backdoors within workspaces
Exfiltration of code or credentials
Compromise of developer machines and upstream CI/CD pipelines
Supply-chain exposure for organizations using AI-assisted development
Because AI agents operate continuously, a single poisoned file or external reference can compromise entire repositories.
Why It Matters
AI-enhanced IDEs blur the line between developer assistance and autonomous execution. As a result, long-trusted features—search, file editing, workspace configuration—become high-leverage attack surfaces. IDEsaster underscores the need for a new security paradigm: Secure for AI, where products are designed with awareness of how AI agents can be manipulated.
Expert Commentary
“Connecting AI agents to existing applications creates new emerging risks,” Marzouk notes.
Researchers emphasize strict privilege controls, MCP monitoring, and defensive validation of all external sources. Aikido researcher Rein Daelman adds that any repository using AI automation is now vulnerable to prompt injection–driven supply-chain compromise.
Key Takeaways
AI agents significantly expand the attack surface of development tools.
Prompt injection remains the root cause of most exploit chains.
Auto-approved file writes and tool calls enable silent compromise.
Developers must treat all external context as potentially hostile.
Vendors must adopt "Secure for AI" principles to harden future releases.